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Traxler: Reconciling the South Carolina Death Penalty Statute with the Six
RECONCILING THE SOUTH CAROLINA DEATH PENALTY STATUTE WITH THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT

I.

INTRODUCTION

Capital punishment cases, more than any other, require the intense
protection of a defendant's constitutional rights. Such intense protection is
required because they "involve[] an awesome decision: the determination of' 1
when the State should deliberately take the life of a particular human being."
The legal system must protect individual constitutional rights to prevent the State
from abusing this incredible power. Furthermore, the nature of the death penalty
itself makes it imperative that defendants receive the fullest extent of
constitutional protections possible. By its very nature, "[t]he death penalty is a
uniquely final, irreversible form of punishment. ' 3 Once the State carries out a
death sentence, it becomes impossible to compensate the victim or to otherwise
rectify the sentence if the State imposed it erroneously. Therefore, when
defendants are on trial for their lives, the legal system must strive to ensure that
their constitutional rights are protected.
South Carolina's death penalty statute, South Carolina Code section 16-3-20,
denies defendants who plead guilty to murder the option of a jury trial to
determine the existence of any aggravating circumstances that could make them
eligible for the death penalty. 4 This effectively denies defendants an important
constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment. Defendants have a right for a
jury to determine the existence of any facts, except for prior convictions, that can
enhance their sentences "beyond the.., statutory maximum" that would
otherwise be imposed if the facts did not exist.6 This includes the right for a jury
to determine the existence of any aggravating circumstances that could subject a
defendant to the death penalty as opposed to life imprisonment, the statutory
maximum sentence for murder absent any aggravating circumstances. 7 Even
when defendants plead guilty to murder, they retain this right to a jury trial at the
sentencing phase to determine the existence of any aggravating circumstances
that they did not admit and that could enhance their punishment from life
imprisonment to death.8
In light of recent decisions from the United States Supreme Court, the South
Carolina death penalty statute, section 16-3-20, is unconstitutional because it

1. F. Patrick Hubbard et al., A "Meaningful" Basis for the Death Penalty: The Practice,
Constitutionality, and Justice of CapitalPunishment in South Carolina, 34 S.C. L. REV. 391, 414
(1982).
2.

2008).
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

See LINDA E. CARTER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW 19 (2d ed.

Hubbard et al., supra note 1, at 582.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (2003).
See discussion infra Part II.A-B.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004).
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denies defendants who plead guilty to murder of their right for a jury to
determine the existence of any aggravating circumstances that could enhance
their maximum punishment from life imprisonment to death. 9 For section 16-320 to be constitutionally acceptable, the legislature needs to amend the law to
allow the trial judge to impanel a jury at the sentencing phase to determine the
existence of aggravating circumstances. 1°At the same time, however, any
amendment needs to take into consideration evidentiary issues that could arise in
a separate sentencing phase to determine the existence of aggravating
circumstances. The State has an interest in ensuring that jurors contemplating a
sentence of death have all the necessary evidence in front of them. This requires
that the State be able to present some evidence of the murder to satisfy juror
expectations even if the defendant pleaded guilty. Therefore, at the sentencing
phase, the State must be able to present evidence that is relevant to a sentence of
death and not just evidence that is relevant to the existence of aggravating
circumstances.
Mississippi's death penalty statute provides a good model for amendment
because it provides defendants who plead guilty to murder the option of a jury
trial at the sentencing phase, and it also allows for the admission of all evidence
relevant to sentencing, not just evidence relevant to the existence of aggravating
circumstances.12 Allowing the admission of all evidence relevant to sentencing
enables the State to present evidence necessary for a jury to determine whether to
sentence the defendant to death. This includes evidence of the murder that is not
otherwise relevant to the existence of aggravating circumstances, but that a jury
would expect to hear before sentencing a defendant to death. Under this model,
the trial judge would maintain discretion in determining how much of that
evidence should be admitted.
This Comment is intended to serve a practical, as well as an academic,
purpose. It is meant to encourage the judiciary in South Carolina to recognize
that defendants are being denied an important constitutional right in the most
serious cases-capital punishment cases. Moreover, it is intended to alert
lawmakers to an unconstitutional statute and to provide them with a basis for
amending it. Finally, this Comment provides attorneys with the information
necessary to advocate for their clients who are denied this right. Part II discusses
the relevant procedure and history of section 16-3-20. It focuses on how courts
dealt with defendants who pleaded guilty in capital cases before the United
States Supreme Court interpreted a Sixth Amendment right for a jury to
determine the existence of aggravating circumstances. Part 111 then examines
how recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court rendered the statute
unconstitutional. Moreover, it discusses subsequent attempts by the South

9.
10.
11.
12.

See discussion infra Part 1II.B.
See discussion infra Part IV.D.
See discussion infra Part IV.D.
See MISS. CODEANN. § 99-19-101 (2007).
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Carolina Supreme Court to deal with the issue, why these decisions are in error,
and correspondingly, why the issue is not settled. Part IV analyzes different
approaches to curing the constitutional defects of the statute. It then proposes
how best to amend the statute to make it constitutionally acceptable while also
considering evidentiary problems that could arise. This involves allowing for
trial courts to impanel a jury at the sentencing proceeding and allowing for the
admission of all evidence relevant to a sentence of death. Part V concludes by
calling on the legislature to take a proactive approach in amending the statute
rather than waiting for a court-ordered mandate. It also challenges the judiciary
to uphold its responsibility of ensuring that defendants in capital cases enjoy the
fullest extent of constitutional protections.
II.

THE PROCEDURE AND HISTORY OF SECTION

16-3-20

A. Procedure
Section 16-3-20 creates a bifurcated scheme for capital punishment cases
where there is a guilt phase and a sentencing
phase.13 First, at
the
•
• the guilt phase,
14
trier of fact must determine whether the defendant committed murder. If the
trier of fact finds the defendant guilty of murder, then there is a sentencing phase
to determine the severity of the defendant's punishment. 15 The statute requires
that twenty-four hours pass between the end of the guilt phase and the beginning
of the sentencing phase, unless the defendant waives this requirement. 16
Before a defendant may be sentenced to death under section 16-3-20, the
trier of fact at the sentencing
proceeding
must first find the existence of at least
•
,, 17
one "aggravating circumstance.
To illustrate, aggravating circumstances
include murder committed during criminal sexual conduct, kidnapping, burglary,
or physical torture; prior convictions for murder; and the murder of a law
enforcement officer. 18 Upon finding the existence of at least one aggravating
circumstance, the defendant may be sentenced to death. 19 If no aggravating
circumstance is found, however, then the maximum sentence that may be
imposed is life imprisonment. 20 At the sentencing proceeding, the prosecution

13. See Hubbard et al.,
supra note 1, at401.
14. Id. at 397.
15. Id.
16. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (2003) ("The proceeding must be conducted.., as
soon as practicable after the lapse of twenty-four hours unless waived by the defendant.").
17. Id.
18. Id. § 16-3-20(C)(a). Section 16-3-20(C)(a) provides a complete list of aggravating
circumstances.
19. See id. § 16-3-20(B).
20. Id.
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must prove the existence of an aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable
doubt.21
The nature of the proceeding at the guilt phase determines who will be the
trier of fact at the sentencing proceeding.22 If a jury convicts the defendant of
murder at the guilt phase, then the same jury must determine the existence of any
aggravating circumstances at the sentencing phase. However, if the defendant
pleads guilty to murder at the guilt phase, then section 16-3-20 requires that the
trial judge conduct the sentencing phase. 24 The statute mandates that "if the
defendant pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding must be conducted before
the judge." 5 In State v. Truesdale,26 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
"section 16-3-20(B) ... requires sentencing by the trial judge, not a jury,
when... the defendant has entered a guilty plea." 27 Therefore, when defendants
plead guilty to murder in South Carolina, they automatically waive their right for
a jury to determine the existence of any aggravating circumstances at the
sentencing phase. 28 Instead, they must submit themselves to the mercy of the
trial judge.29 This is crucial because the trier of fact at the sentencing phase
decides the existence
of any aggravating circumstances that could result in a
30
death sentence.
B. History
Section 16-3-20 went into effect in 1977. 31 The General Assembly enacted
this legislation in response to the South Carolina Supreme Court's
pronouncement that the previous death penalty statute was unconstitutional in
State v. Rumsey. 32 In Rumsey, the court determined that the previous death
penalty statute was unconstitutional because it imposed a mandatory death
sentence for certain offenses and did not allow for any discretion on the part of

21. See Hubbard et al., supra note 1, at 416 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (Supp.
1981)); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (2003) (providing that aggravating circumstances can
increase the maximum penalty for murder from life imprisonment to death and the jury must find
them to exist beyond a reasonable doubt); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)
("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.").
22. See § 16-3-20(B).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. (emphasis added).
26. 278 S.C. 368, 296 S.E.2d 528 (1982).
27. Id. at 369, 296 S.E.2d at 529 (citing State v. Patterson, 278 S.C. 319, 322, 295 S.E.2d
264, 266 (1982)).
28. See Hubbard et al., supra note 1, at411.
29. See id.
30. See § 16-3-20(B).
31. See Hubbard et al., supra note 1, at 396.
32. Id. (citing State v. Rumsey, 267 S.C. 236, 239, 226 S.E.2d 894, 895 (1976)).
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the sentencing entity to impose a lesser sentence. 33 The General Assembly
subsequently passed section 16-3-20 to cure these defects. 34 While section 16-320 allows for the imposition of the death penalty if the trier of fact finds any
aggravating circumstances, it does not require the death penalty; instead, the
35 trier
of fact maintains discretion to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment.
State and federal courts soon had to determine the constitutionality of the
provision in section 16-3-20 that requires the trial court to conduct the
sentencing phase alone when the defendant pleads guilty to murder. 36 A little
less than two years after the legislature enacted section 16-3-20, the South
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed its constitutionality. 37 In State v. Shaw, the
defendant pleaded guilty to murder, conspiracy, rape, kidnapping, and armed
robbery. 38 The trial judge conducted the sentencing proceeding alone and
sentenced the defendant to death.39 The court examined the procedures set forth
in section 16-3-20, including the requirement that the trial judge conduct the
sentencing proceeding alone after a guilty plea, and determined that they were
constitutional. 40 It reasoned that the procedures set forth in section 16-3-20 were
"constitutionally indistinguishable" from the procedures declared constitutional
41
by the United States Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia.
After considering the defendant's petition for habeas corpus relief, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the South
Carolina Supreme Court's decision. 42 At the Fourth Circuit, the defendant
specifically asserted that section 16-3-20 denied him a constitutional right to a
jury trial at the sentencing phase after he pleaded guilty. 43 He argued that section
16-3-20 violated the Constitution because it denied defendants who plead guilty
to murder a constitutional right to a jury trial at the sentencing phase." The
Fourth Circuit dismissed this argument, simply stating that "[t]he Constitution
does not give state criminal defendants the right to jury sentencing." 45 In

33. Rumsey, 267 S.C. at 239, 226 S.E.2d at 895.
34. See Hubbard et al., supra note 1,at 396-97.
35. See § 16-3-20(B).
36. See Roach v.Martin, 757 F.2d 1463, 1481 (4th Cir. 1985); Shaw v. Martin, 733 F.2d 304,
317 (4th Cir. 1984); State v. Patterson, 278 S.C. 319, 321, 295 S.E.2d 264, 265 (1982),overruled on
other grounds by State v.Torrence, 305 S.C.45, 69 n.5,406 S.E.2d 315, 328 n.5 (1991).
37. State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 211, 255 S.E.2d 799, 807 (1979), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 69 n.5, 406 S.E.2d 315, 328 n.5 (1991).
38. Id. at 198-99, 255 S.E.2d at 801.
39. Id. at 199, 255 S.E.2d at 801.
40. Id. at 199-203, 255 S.E.2d at 802-04.
41. Id. at 203, 255 S.E.2d at 803-04 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 164-65, 207
(1976) (upholding Georgia's bifurcated death penalty scheme that required the fact finder to find the
existence of at least one statutorily enumerated aggravated circumstance before itsentenced the
defendant to death)).
42. Shaw v. Martin, 733 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 1984).
43. Id.at317.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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addition, the defendant argued that the statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause because it provided different jury trial rights at the sentencing proceeding
to those who pleaded guilty to murder than it did to those convicted by a jury.
The statute denies a jury trial at the sentencing proceeding to defendants who
plead puilty to murder, but it provides one to defendants convicted of murder by
a jury. The Fourth Circuit dismissed this argument as well, noting the historical
tradition of allowing
the states to split sentencing responsibilities between the
48
judge and the jury.
49
A year later, the Fourth Circuit revisited the issue in Roach v. Martin.
Roach arose from the same set of facts as Shaw.50 The defendant pleaded guilty
to murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, and criminal sexual conduct. 51 Sitting
without a jury, the trial judge heard evidence of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and sentenced the defendant to death.52 At the Fourth Circuit, the
defendant insisted that the denial of a jury trial at the sentencing phase denied
him his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 53 Citing its
recent decision in Shaw, the court reiterated that "'[t]he Constitution does not
give state criminal defendants the right to jury sentencing.' 54 The Fourth Circuit
rejected the argument that the statute violated the Sixth Amendment by denying
a jury trial
at the sentencing proceeding to defendants who plead guilty to
55
murder.
In State v. Patterson,56 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
section 16-3-20 prevents defendants who plead guilty to murder from receiving a
jury trial at the sentencing phase.57 Pattersoninvolved a defendant who pleaded
guilty to murder and armed robbery on the condition that he would retain a jury
trial at the sentencing phase. 58 The State objected to this condition and
maintained that "there is no constitutional right to jury determination of sentence
and [section 16-3-20] does not offer a defendant that option." 59 Nevertheless, the
trial court allowed for ajury trial at the sentencing phase, and the jury sentenced
the defendant to death. In overturning the trial court's decision, the supreme
court determined that the statute requires that the trial judge conduct the

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
305 S.C.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id. at317 &n.16 (citing S.C. CODEANN § 16-3-20 (2003)).
Id. (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 22 (1973)).
757 F.2d 1463, 1481 (4th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1467-68.
Id. at 1467.
Id. at 1468-69.
Id. at 1481.
Id. (quoting Shaw v. Martin, 733 F.2d 304, 317 (4th Cir. 1984)).
Id.
278 S.C. 319, 295 S.E.2d 264 (1982), overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence,
45, 69 n.5, 406 S.E.2d 315, 328 n.5 (1991).
Id. at 321-22, 295 S.E.2d at 265-66.
Id. at 321, 295 S.E.2d at 265.
Id.
Id.
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sentencing phase alone after a defendant pleads guilty. 61 Relying on Shaw, the
court affirmed the constitutionality of this requirement. 62 Finally, the court held
that the guilty plea was invalid because it was conditioned
on a jury trial at the
63
sentencing phase and the statute prohibited this condition.
Likewise, in Walton v. Arizona,64 the United States Supreme Court explicitly
rejected the argument that defendants maintain a right for a jury to determine the
existence of ang aggravating circumstances that could make them eligible for the
death penalty. In Walton, a jury found the defendant guilty of first degree
murder, and pursuant to an Arizona statute the trial judge conducted a separate
sentencing proceeding without a jury to determine the existence of any
aggravating circumstances. 66 At the proceeding, the judge found two aggravating
circumstances and sentenced the defendant to death. 67 The defendant challenged
the Arizona statute, which required the trial judge to conduct the sentencing
proceeding without a jury, on the basis that it violated his Sixth Amendment
rights. 68 More specifically, the defendant argued that "every finding of fact
' 69
underlying the sentencing decision must be made by a jury, not by a judge."
The Court rejected this argument, holding that defendants do not have a Sixth
Amendment right for a jury to determine the existence of
aggravating
70
circumstances that could make them eligible for the death penalty.
Very soon after the passage of section 16-3-20, federal and state courts
affirmed its constitutionality and rejected the argument that defendants maintain
a Sixth Amendment right at the sentencing phase after they plead guilty to
murder at the guilt phase. 71 Moreover, as late as 1990, the United States Supreme
Court rejected the argument that defendants have a right under the Sixth
Amendment for a jury to determine the existence of aggravating circumstances
that could make them eligible for the death penalty. Thus, as the twentieth
century drew to an end, the constitutionality of section 16-3-20 seemed safe.

61. Id.
62. Id. n.1 (citing Shaw v. State, 273 S.C. 194, 211, 255 S.E.2d 799, 807 (1979) overruled on
other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 69 n.5,406 S.E.2d 315, 328 n.5 (1991)).
63. Id. at 322, 295 S.E.2d at 266.
64. 497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
65. Id. at 648-49.
66. Id. at 645.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 647.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 648-49.
71. See Roach v. Martin, 757 F.2d 1463, 1481 (4th Cir. 1985); Shaw v. Martin, 733 F.2d 304,
317 (4th Cir. 1984); State v. Patterson, 278 S.C. 319, 321 n.1, 295 S.E.2d 264, 265 n.1 (1982),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 69 n.5, 406 S.E.2d 315, 328 n.5
(1991).
72. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584, 609 (2002).
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The landscape changed in 2000 when the United States Supreme Court
handed down Apprendi v. New Jersey. 73 Apprendi immediately put the
constitutionality of section 16-3-20 in jeopardy, and in subsequent years, the
Court decided a series of cases that sealed the statute's fate. The Court
established that criminal defendants in capital punishment cases maintain a Sixth
Amendment right for a jury to determine the existence of aggravating
circumstances that could make them eligible for the death penalty even when
they plead guilty to murder at the guilt phase. 74 Section 16-3-20 violates this
Sixth Amendment right by denying defendants who plead guilty to murder the
option for a jury to determine the existence of aggravating circumstances 75that
could increase their punishment from life imprisonment to the death penalty.
A.

Reinterpretingthe Sixth Amendment: Establishing the Right for a Jury
to Determine Sentence-EnhancingFacts Following a Guilty Plea

In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held that "[o]ther than the fact
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt." 76 Police had arrested the defendant in Apprendi for firing
shots "into the home of an African-American family that had recently moved
into a previously all-white neighborhood., 77 Following the arrest, the defendant
made a statement that he fired the shots into the home because the family was
African-American. 78 The defendant pleaded guilty to "two counts.., of...
possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose" as well as "one
count.., of... unlawful possession of an antipersonnel bomb.,, 79 Each count of
possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose carried a potential maximum
sentence of ten years. However, a New Jersey hate crime statute allowed the
trial judge to extend the maximum punishment for possession of a firearm for an
unlawful purpose to twenty years if the judge found that the "'defendant in

73. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
74. Compare Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04, 313 (2004) (establishing that
defendants who plead guilty have a Sixth Amendment right to insist for a jury to determine
sentence-enhancing facts that they did not admit), with Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002)
(establishing that aggravating circumstances making defendants eligible for the death penalty are
sentence-enhancing facts subject to Sixth Amendment requirements), and Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490
(holding that defendants have a Sixth Amendment right for a jury to find the existence of all facts
that can increase their sentences "beyond the prescribed statutory maximum," except for prior
convictions).
75. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (2003).
76. 530 U.S. at 490.
77. Id. at 469.
78. Id. (quoting State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 486 (N.J. 1999)).
79. Id. at 469-70.
80. Id. at 470 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(2) (West 1995)).
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committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group
of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual
orientation or ethnicity."' 81 After accepting the guilty plea, the trial judge
conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defendant committed
the offense as a hate crime.82 The trial judge, sitting without a jury, found that
the defendant committed the offense as a hate crime. 83 Accordingly, he extended
the sentence for one count of possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose
from the otherwise maximum sentence of ten years to twelve years.84
The United States Supreme Court found the hate crime statute
unconstitutional because it denied defendants the right for a jury to determine all
facts that contribute to their sentences. 85 The Court held that "[o]ther than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt." This right for a jury to determine the existence of
facts that can enhance a sentence beyond the statutory maximum is rooted in the
Sixth Amendment. 87 The Court reasoned that defendants retain the same
"procedural safeguards" in the determination of facts that can extend punishment
for an offense as they do in the determination of facts concerning whether to
impose punishment in the first place. 88 Therefore, it was unconstitutional for the
trial court to deny the defendant the procedural safeguard of a jury trial when
determining whether the defendant committed the offense as a hate crime
because that determination could extend the maximum punishment that he
faced.89
Two years later, the Court extended this right to defendants in capital
punishment cases, holding that they have a Sixth Amendment right for a jury to
determine the existence of any aggravating circumstances
that could increase
90
9
their punishment from life imprisonment to death. In Ring v. Arizona,91 a jury
convicted the defendant of first degree murder. 92 Under Arizona law, the court
could sentence the defendant to death only if an aggravating circumstance
accompanied the murder. 93 In the absence of an aggravating circumstance,
however, the maximum punishment that the court could impose on the defendant

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 468-69 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 1999-2000)).
Id. at 470.
See id. at 471.
Id.
Id. at 490-92.
Id. at 490.
Id. at 476 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999)).
See id.
See id. at491-92.
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
Id. at584.
Id. at591.
Id. at 593 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F) (Supp. 2001)).
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was life imprisonment.94 The statute required the trial judge to conduct a hearing
95
without a jury to determine the existence of any aggravating circumstances.
Accordingly, the trial judge found the existence of two aggravating
circumstances: the defendant committed murder for pecuniary gain and the
murder was "especially heinous, cruel or depraved.' ,96 The trial judge sentenced
the defendant to death. 7
Despite having earlier upheld Arizona's death penalty statute in Walton v.
Arizona, the Court found the Arizona statute unconstitutional because it denied
the defendant a jury trial to determine the existence of agravating circumstances
that could make him eligible for the death penalty. The Court noted that
"Walton and Apprendi are irreconcilable," and accordingly, it overruled
Walton. 1°° In light of Apprendi's reasoning, the Court recognized that it would
be illogical to provide a right for a jury to determine the existence of facts that
could increase a defendant's sentence by two years, but not provide the same
right for a jury to determine the existence of facts that could increase a
defendant's sentence to death. 10 1 Therefore, it held that the Sixth Amendment
provides defendants convicted of murder the right for a jury to determine the
existence of any aggravating circumstances that could make them eligible for the
death penalty. Since the maximum punishment that the defendant faced in the
absence of an aggravating circumstance was life imprisonment, the Arizona
statute violated the Sixth Amendment by requiring the trial judge to determine
the existence of any aggravating circumstances that could enhance the
defendant's punishment to death. 103
Immediately, Apprendi and Ring posed a threat to states that required the
trial judge to determine the existence of any aggravating circumstances after a
defendant pleaded guilty. 104 States sought to distinguish this requirement from
Ring by insisting that when defendants plead guilty to murder at the guilt phase,

94. Id. at 592 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(C) (2001)).
95. Id. (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (Supp. 2001)).
96. Id. at 594-95.
97. Id. at 595.
98. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584, 609 (2002).
99. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 588-89. The Arizona legislature has since amended its death penalty statute to
provide for the trier of fact to determine the existence of aggravating circumstances at the
sentencing proceeding. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.01(C) (Supp. 2008). The trier of fact must
be a jury unless both the State and the defendant waive a jury trial. Id. § 13-703.01(S).
104. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 771 N.E.2d 46, 48-49 (Ind. 2002) (involving a challenge to
Indiana's death penalty procedure where the trial judge determined the existence of aggravating
circumstances after the defendant pleaded guilty to murder).
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they simultaneously waive their right to a jury trial at the sentencing phase. 105
For example, the Indiana Supreme Court applied this line of reasoning in Moore
10 7
v. State.10° In Moore, the defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of murder.
After the trial court sentenced him to death, he appealed on the basis that the
Indiana statute denied him his Sixth Amendment right for a jury to determine the
existence of any aggravating circumstances that could warrant the death
penalty. 18 The Indiana Supreme Court rejected this argument because "[the
defendant's] plea of guilty forfeited any such claimed entitlement."109 It reasoned
that this was especially true because the trial court advised the defendant that he
would forfeit
his right to a jury trial at the sentencing phase if he pleaded guilty
110
to murder.
In 2004, however, the United States Supreme Court held that defendants do
not automatically forfeit their right for a jury to determine facts that could
enhance their punishment when they plead guilty to an underlying offense but
not the sentence-enhancing facts.1 11 In Blakely v. Washington, 12 the defendant
pleaded guilty to "second-degree kidnaping involving domestic violence and use
of a firearm." 113 His guilty plea only contained facts admitting the elements of
that offense. 114 The maximum sentence that he faced under the facts admitted in
his guilty plea was fifty-three months. 115 A Washington statute, however,
allowed for trial judges to impose an "exceptional sentence" beyond the statutory
maximum if they found any aggravating factors that warranted an extended
sentence. 116 Under this statute, the trial judge determined that the defendant
committed the crime with "deliberate cruelty." 117 Therefore, the trial judge
"imposed an exceptional sentence of 90 months[, which was] 37 months beyond
the standard maximum."
Following an objection, the trial judge conducted a
bench hearing where he made thirty-two findings of fact to support his
exceptional sentence. 119 The defendant appealed on the basis that "this
sentencing procedure deprived him of his federal constitutional
right to have a
120
jury determine.., all facts legally essential to his sentence."

105. See, e.g., id. at 49 (holding that the defendant forfeited his right for a jury to determine
the existence of aggravating circumstances after he pleaded guilty).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 48.
108. Id. at 49.
109. Id.
110. Id. (quoting Moore v. State, 479 N.E.2d 1264, 1268 (Ind. 1985)).
111. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004).
112. Id. at 296.
113. Id. at 298-99.
114. Id. at 299.
115. Id. at 298.
116. Id. at 299 (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.120(2) (West 2000)).
117. Id. at 300.
118. Id.

119. Id. at 300-01.
120. Id. at 301.
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The Court overturned this sentencing procedure, holding that defendants
who plead guilty retain a Sixth Amendment right for a jury to determine all facts
to which they did not admit and that could extend their sentences beyond the
statutory maximum provided under the facts that they admitted. 121 The Court
clarified that the "statutory maximum" for a crime is based "solely on ... the
facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." 122 The statutory
maximum is the maximum sentence that the judge "may impose without any
additional findings" outside of the facts contained in the jury verdict or the guilty
plea. 123 The Court made clear, however, that its ruling does not prevent
defendants from waiving their right for a jury to determine facts that could
enhance their sentences.
It maintained that "[w]hen a defendant pleads guilty,
the State is free to seek judicial sentence enhancements so long as the defendant
either stipulates to the relevant facts or consents to judicial factfinding." 125
However, while defendants are free to waive their right for a jury to determine
facts that could enhance their sentences, they cannot be denied their
constitutional right to demand such a jury trial. 126 When defendants plead guilty
to an offense, they waive their right to a jury trial for the facts that they admit,
but they retain the right to insist that a jury examine facts that they did not admit
and that could enhance their sentences beyond the statutory maximum. 127
B. The ConstitutionalDefects of Section 16-3-20
Section 16-3-20 violates the Sixth Amendment because it denies defendants
who plead guilty to murder the right for a jury to determine the existence of any
aggravating circumstances that could warrant the death penalty. The Sixth
Amendment provides criminal defendants with the right for a jury to determine
any facts that could increase their sentences beyond the statutory maximum
otherwise required for an offense in the absence of those facts. 128 The statutory
maximum for an offense is the maximum sentence allowed under "the facts
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." 129 Under section 16-320, the maximum sentence allowed for murder in the absence of any aggravating
circumstances is life imprisonment. 130 Aggravating circumstances, therefore, are
facts that can increase this maximum sentence from life imprisonment to
death. 131 Since these facts can increase the statutory maximum sentence for

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 303-04.
Id. at 303 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 303-04 (emphasis omitted).
Id.at 310.
Id.
See id. at 313.
Id.at 303-04, 313.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (emphasis omitted).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (2003).
See id.
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murder, defendants have a Sixth Amendment right for a jury to determine the
existence of such facts.
When a defendant pleads guilty to murder, section 16-3-20 requires the trial
judge to determine the existence of aggravating circumstances and does not
provide the defendant with the option of insisting on a jury trial. 132 If the
defendant does not admit any aggravating circumstances in the guilty plea or
consent to the judicial fact-finding, then the trial judge must engage in judicial
fact-finding to determine their existence. Section 16-3-20 does not provide
defendants who plead guilty to murder with the option of insisting on a jury trial
at the sentencing proceeding. 134 Essentially, when defendants plead guilty to
murder, section 16-3-20 requires automatic forfeiture of their Sixth Amendment
135
right for a jury to determine the existence of any aggravating circumstances.
While Blakely held that defendants can voluntarily waive their right for a
jury to determine sentence-enhancing facts by consenting to the judicial factfinding or admitting the aggravating circumstances, the holding made it clear
that denying this right altogether violates the Sixth Amendment. 136 Because
section 16-3-20 denies defendants the right to insist that a jury determine the
existence of aggravating circumstances after they plead guilty to murder, even
when they do not admit the aggravating circumstances or voluntarily consent to
the judicial fact-finding, the statute violates the Sixth Amendment.
C. South Carolina'sFailedAttempts to Deal with the Issue Post-Blakely
On three occasions since Blakely, the South Carolina Supreme Court has
been presented with the issue concerning the denial of the right for a jury to
determine the existence of aggravating circumstances when defendants plead
guilty to murder. 137 None of the decisions have reached a satisfactory result. In
State v. Downs,138 the defendant admitted raping and killing a six-year-old boy
and pleaded guilty to the charges of "murder, kidnapping, and first-degree
criminal sexual conduct with a minor."' 139 Before accepting the guilty plea, the
trial court asked the defendant if he "wanted to impanel a jury, admit guilt, and
ask the jury to decide the sentence." 140 The trial court further warned the
defendant that by pleading guilty, he would forfeit his right to a jury trial at both

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
S.C. 135,
(2004).
138.
139.
140.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 310, 313 (2004).
See State v. Crisp, 362 S.C. 412, 417, 608 S.E.2d 429, 432 (2005); State v. Wood, 362
143, 607 S.E.2d 57, 61 (2004); State v. Downs, 361 S.C. 141, 146, 604 S.E.2d 377, 380
361 S.C. 141, 604 S.E.2d 377 (2004).
Id. at 143, 604 S.E.2d at 378.
Id. at 144, 604 S.E.2d at 379.
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the guilt and sentencing phases. 141 The defendant still insisted that he wanted to
plead guilty, and the court accepted his guilty plea.142 At the sentencing phase,
the trial court found three aggravating circumstances: the defendant committed
criminal sexual conduct along with the murder, the defendant committed the
murder during the course of a kidnapping, and the defendant murdered a child
eleven-years-old or younger. 143 As a result, the "court sentenced [the defendant]
to death." 144 The defendant appealed, arguing that the sentencing
procedure used
145
by the court violated the Supreme Court's holding in Ring.
The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the sentencing procedure set
146
forth in section 16-3-20, ruling that it does not violate any right to a jury trial.
The court distinguished the procedure set forth in section 16-3-20 from the
Arizona procedure invalidated by Ring. 14 7 It reasoned that whereas the Arizona
procedure in Ring required a judge to determine the existence of any aggravating
circumstances after a jury convicted the defendant of murder, section 16-3-20
allows for a jury to determine their existence after it convicts the defendant of
murder. 148 Furthermore, the court held that "Ring did not involve jury-trial
waivers and is not implicated when a defendant pleads guilty." 14 9 The court
noted that the defendant knew that he would forfeit his right to a jury150trial at
sentencing by pleading guilty, but he proceeded to plead guilty anyway. At no
point in its reasoning, however, did the court mention, much less analyze,
Blakely.
Shortly thereafter, the South Carolina Supreme Court revisited the issue in
State v. Wood. 151 In Wood, a jury convicted the defendant of murdering a police
officer, and the defendant was sentenced to death. 152 On appeal, the defendant
argued that section 16-3-20 violates Ring because it denies defendants
who plead
•153
guilty to murder the right to a jury•154trial at the sentencing
phase.
The court
•,
affirmed its previous decision in Downs. It again reasoned that "Ring did not
involve jury-trial waivers and is not implicated when a defendant pleads
guilty."155

141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 143, 604 S.E.2d at 378.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 146, 604 S.E.2d at 380 (discussing S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (2003); Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)).
146. Id. at 147, 604 S.E.2d at 380.
147. Id. at 146, 604 S.E.2d at 380.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 147, 604 S.E.2d at 380.
151. 362 S.C. 135, 143, 607 S.E.2d 57, 61 (2004).
152. Id. at 137, 607 S.E.2d at 58.
153. Id. at 143, 607 S.E.2d at 61.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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Finally, in State v. Crisp,156 the South Carolina Supreme Court once again
reaffirmed its decision in Downs and upheld the constitutionality of section 16-320. 157In Crisp, the defendant pleaded guilty to murdering one victim and
assaulting another. 158 Immediately after the defendant entered these guilty pleas,
the "State officially served notice of [its] intent to seek the death penalty in
connection with the murder of [a third victim]." 159 The aggravating
circumstances that the State sought to prove were "[the] prior conviction of
murder and physical torture." 16° The defendant pleaded guilty to murdering the
third victim, and the trial judge conducted the sentencing hearing without a jury
and sentenced the defendant to death. 161 On appeal,
the defendant argued that
162
section 16-3-20 violated the rule set forth in Ring.
The court reiterated its holding in Downs, upholding the constitutionality of
section 16-3-20. 163 Nonetheless, the court did state that it "granted [the
defendant's] motion to argue against the precedent of Downs. 1M64 In attempting
to distinguish its case from Downs, the defendant's counsel set forth three
distinctions: the defendant "sought a life sentence"; the defendant "exhibited
remorse for his crimes"; and the defendant "offered a reason for his
actions... that he murdered [the victims] ... because he believed they were
drug dealers who intended to harm his family."' 165 The court noted that these
distinctions did not pertain to the issue of whether the procedure in section 16-320 unconstitutionally denied the defendant a jury trial right. 166 Therefore, it
rejected the defendant's contentions167that section 16-3-20 was unconstitutional
and reaffirmed its holding in Downs.
Despite the holdings in Downs, Wood, and Crisp, the issue concerning
section 16-3-20's constitutionality when a defendant pleads guilty has not been
satisfactorily resolved. In fact, the South Carolina Supreme Court demonstrated
that the issue was still open by explicitly allowing the defendant in Crisp to
challenge the precedent set forth in Downs,168 despite having affirmed the Downs
holding less than a year earlier. 169 To declare section 16-3-20 unconstitutional,
the court would have to overrule its sweeping language in Downs which upheld
the constitutionality of section 16-3-20. The court should overrule its decision in

156. 362 S.C. 412, 608 S.E.2d 429 (2005).
157. Id. at 419, 608 S.E.2d at 433.
158. Id. at 413, 608 S.E.2d at 430.
159. Id. at 413-14, 608 S.E.2d at 430.
160. Id. at 414, 608 S.E.2d at 430.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 417, 608 S.E.2d at 432.
163. Id. at 417-18, 608 S.E.2d at 432-33 (citing State v. Downs, 361 S.C. 141, 146-47, 604
S.E.2d 377, 380 (2004)).
164. Id. at 418, 608 S.E.2d at 433.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 418-19,608 S.E.2d at 433.
167. Id. at 419, 608 S.E.2d at 433.
168. Id. at 418, 608 S.E.2d at 433.
169. State v. Wood, 362 S.C. 135, 143, 607 S.E.2d 57, 61 (2004).
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Downs for several reasons, not the least of which is because its implications are
at odds with the United States Supreme Court's holding in Blakely. While the
conclusion in Downs was not necessarily incorrect, the court's reasoning is
problematic because it is overinclusive and fails to recognize Blakely, which
should have been crucial to the analysis.
The South Carolina Supreme Court's conclusion in Downs was not
incorrect. In Blakely, the Court established that defendants could waive their
right for a jury to determine aggravating circumstances when they admit those
facts in their guilty pleas. 170 Falling within this exception, in Downs, the
defendant admitted the aggravating circumstances in his guilty plea. 171
Therefore, the defendant properly waived his right to a jury trial at the
sentencing phase under the rule established in Blakely, and the trial judge was
not required to engage in any judicial fact-finding outside of the facts admitted in
the guilty plea.
Furthermore, in Downs, the defendant voluntarily and
explicitly waived his right to a jury trial at the sentencing phase. 173 Again,
Blakely established that defendants could voluntarily waive their constitutional
right for a jury to determine any facts that could enhance their sentence beyond
the statutory maximum. 174 On these bases alone, the court could have upheld the
defendant's death sentence without addressing the constitutionality of section
16-3-20.
Instead, the court held that section 16-3-20 does not violate the Sixth
Amendment even though it denies defendants who plead guilty the option of a
jury trial to determine the existence of aggravating circumstances. 175 This
holding is overinclusive because it does not just include the situation presented
in Downs where the defendant admitted the aggravating circumstances in his
guilty plea and explicitly waived his right to a jury trial at sentencing.176 It also
includes situations where a defendant pleads guilty to murder without admitting
any aggravating circumstances and where the defendant insists on a jury trial at
sentencing. 177 Blakely treats these two situations differently. 178 In Blakely, the
Court made it clear that while defendants can voluntarily waive their right for a
jury to determine sentence-enhancing facts, they must at least be provided the
option to exercise this right. 179 Section 16-3-20 denies defendants this option by

170. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 310 (2004).
171. State v. Downs, 361 S.C. 141, 143, 604 S.E.2d 377, 378 (2004).
172. Compare Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310 (holding that defendants can waive their right for a
jury to determine sentence-enhancing facts by admitting those facts in a guilty plea), with Downs,
361 S.C. at 143, 604 S.E.2d at 378 (acknowledging that the defendant admitted the aggravating
circumstances in his guilty plea).
173. Downs, 361 S.C. at 144, 604 S.E.2d at 379.
174. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310.
175. Downs, 361 S.C. at 147, 604 S.E.2d at 380.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310, 313.
179. See id. at 313.
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requiring the trial judge to conduct the sentencing proceeding alone whenever
defendants plead guilty to murder. 180 Even if defendants do not admit the
aggravating circumstances in their guilty pleas and even if they insist on a jury
trial at sentencing, section 16-3-20 requires that the trial judge conduct the
sentencing proceeding alone.181 Therefore, the South Carolina Supreme Court's
holding in Downs is overinclusive and defies the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Blakely.
Finally, the decision in Downs is problematic because it failed to even
mention Blakely, much less justify how section 16-3-20 is constitutional in light
of it. The United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Blakely
nearly two months before the South Carolina Supreme Court heard arguments in
Downs.182 Given the timing, it is unclear why the South Carolina Supreme Court
failed to address a case that should have been pivotal to its analysis. The failure
to discuss Blakely calls into question the validity and precedential value of
Downs. The Colorado Supreme Court recognized this when it noted that "[t]he
Supreme Court of South Carolina is the only court to hold post-Blakely that a
defendant waives his right to jury fact-finding during sentencing by pleading
" 183
guilty, but its failure to cite Blakely suggests those decisions to be in error.
Therefore, South Carolina courts have not yet satisfactorily resolved the
issue. The South Carolina Supreme Court's unequivocal reasoning that section
16-3-20 does not violate the Sixth Amendment in Downs is problematic because
the decision fails to reconcile the statute with Blakely. Furthermore, it is
untenable because the decision runs directly contrary to the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Blakely. A proper argument under Blakely is likely
to reveal the constitutional defects of section 16-3-20 and result in
r. the
184overruling
,
of Downs. Since Wood and Crisp relied on the reasoning of Downs, they, too,
would suffer the same fate.
IV.

PROPOSAL FOR AMENDMENT

South
Carolina's
death penalty
statute, section
16-3-20,
is
unconstitutional. 185 As currently written, it denies defendants in capital
punishment cases an important constitutional right under the Sixth
Amendment. 1 6 The legislature needs to amend the statute to comply with the
constitutional requirements recently articulated by the United States Supreme

180. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (2003).
181. See id.

182. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 296 (decided on June 24, 2004); Downs, 361 S.C. at 141, 604
S.E.2d at 377 (arguments heard on September 21, 2004).
183. People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489, 498 (Colo. 2007).
184. State v. Crisp, 362 S.C. 412, 417-19, 608 S.E.2d 429,432-33 (2005); State v. Wood, 362
S.C. 135, 143, 607 S.E.2d 57, 61 (2004).
185. See discussion supra Part 111.B.
186. See discussion supra Part IH.A-B.
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187

Four options are available to accomplish this goal: (1) abolish the death
penalty altogether; (2) abandon the bifurcated scheme that separates the
sentencing phase from the guilt phase; (3) designate a separate offense of
"capital murder" that includes the aggravating circumstances as part of the
Court.

substantive offense; or (4) amend the statute to allow the trial judge to impanel a
jury at the sentencing phase when a defendant pleads guilty to murder. The
fourth option, amending the statute to allow the trial judge to impanel a jury at
the sentencing phase when a defendant pleads guilty, is the most practical
solution. Mississippi's death penalty statute provides a good model for change
because it allows for the trial judge to impanel a jury and also ensures the
admission of all evidence relevant to sentencing. 188
A.

Option 1: Abolish the Death Penalty

To cure the possibility of any constitutional defect in the death penalty
statute, the legislature has the option of abolishing the death penalty in South
Carolina altogether. If South Carolina chooses to follow this route, it would not
be alone. Fifteen other states have abolished the death penalty. 189 The decision to
abolish the death penalty, however, requires a deep philosophical discussion
and the morality191of capital punishment. 190
punishment
concerning the nature
. . of...
.
That discussion invites its own body of literature.
Instead, this Comment
focuses on the more discrete issue of ensuring that a capital defendant's
constitutional rights are protected in a state that has made the conscious decision
to retain the death penalty. 192 While abolishing the death penalty would certainly
cure the constitutional defects, this Comment assumes that because South
Carolina has retained the death penalty, it is unlikely to abolish the death penalty
altogether. 193 Therefore, this Comment focuses on ensuring that defendants are

187. See discussion supra Part II.A.
188. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (2007).
189. See Death Penalty Information Center, Facts About the Death Penalty 1 (April 17, 2009),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf.
190. Compare Jack Greenberg, Against the American System of Capital Punishment, 99
HARV. L. REv. 1670, 1676-78 (1986) (arguing that capital punishment does not serve deterrence or
retributive theories of punishment), with Ernest van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A
Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1665-69 (1986) (defending capital punishment on the grounds
that it serves deterrence and retributive theories of punishment).
191. See generally Norman Krivosha et al., A Historicaland PhilosophicalLook at the Death
Penalty-Does It Serve Society's Needs?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1 (1982-1983) (providing a
philosophical examination of capital punishment); Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not
Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REv. 751 (2005)
(arguing that capital punishment is not morally required); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is
Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV.
703 (2005) (arguing that capital punishment is morally required because of its deterrent effect).
192. See Hubbard et al., supra note 1, at 396-97 (observing that South Carolina enacted the
current death penalty statute after the previous one was declared unconstitutional).
193. A Gallup poll taken in 2003 found that almost 70% of Americans were in favor of the
death penalty for defendants convicted of murder. Jeffrey M. Jones, UnderstandingAmericans'
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provided their recognized constitutional rights under the existing scheme and
saves the discussion about the validity of the death penalty altogether for another
day.
B. Option 2: Abandon the Bifurcated Scheme
Another option available to the legislature is to abolish the bifurcated
scheme and have one unitary proceeding where the jury determines both guilt
and sentencing. In a unitary scheme, the statute could not deny defendants the
right to a jury trial at the sentencing phase because there would be no sentencing
phase. This is not necessarily forbidden, as "[t]he Supreme Court has never
explicitly held that a bifurcated proceeding is constitutionally required." 194
However, every state that allows for capital punishment uses a bifurcated
scheme. 195 The United States Supreme Court has stated that "a bifurcated system
is more likely
[96to ensure elimination •of197the constitutional deficiencies identified
in Furman." In Furman v. Georgia, the Court issued a ruling that had the
"practical effect of striking down all existing death penalty statutes" on the
grounds that the "statutes created a substantial risk that the death penalty would
be imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner." 198 Given the Court's
endorsement of the bifurcated procedure as a way of solving the Furman
problems, 199 it would be unwise to switch to a procedure that could introduce a
new host of constitutional problems. Therefore, abolishing the bifurcated scheme
and having one proceeding is not the best option.

Support for the Death Penalty, GALLUP, June 3, 2003, http://www.gallup.com/poll/8557/
Understanding-Americans-Support-Death-Penalty.aspx. It also determined that support for the death
penalty was higher in the South, finding that about 75% of southern residents support the death
penalty. Id. For people who identified themselves as Republican, the percentage was higher; the poll
found that about 82% of Republicans supported the death penalty. Id. Given that South Carolina is
southern and currently dominated politically by the Republican Party, these figures suggest that
abolishment of the death penalty is unlikely. In an address to law students in 2006, Judge William
W. Wilkins, then Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
acknowledged this when he stated, "No one (in South Carolina) can be elected to statewide office
who is opposed to the death penalty." Schuyler Kropf, Judge Discusses Death Penalty: Law
Students Are Told Future Lawyers to Decide Value of Capital Punishment, POST & COURIER
(Charleston, S.C.) Sept. 15, 2006, at 3B.
194. CARTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 51.
195. Id.
196. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 191-92 (1976).
197. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
198. CARTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 44 (citing Furman,408 U.S. at 256-57).
199. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 191-92.
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C. Option 3: Designate a Separate Substantive Offense of "Capital
Murder"
Instead of requiring the fact finder to determine the existence of aggravating
circumstances at the sentencing phase, the legislature could revise the statute to
provide for a separate offense of capital murder. This is the approach that Texas
has taken. 20 Under section 19.03 of the Texas Penal Code, Texas designates a
separate offense of "capital murder" which requires the jury to find the
aggravating circumstances along with the murder at the guilt phase of the trial. 201
Both murder and the aggravating circumstance constitute elements of the
substantive offense. 202 For instance, capital murder includes murder
"intentionally commit[ted] ... in the course of committing or attempting to
commit kidnapping." 20 3 At the guilt phase, the jury would determine whether the
defendant committed murder as well as kidnapping. 204 Thus, in Texas, facts
determining eligibility for the death penalty are found at the guilt phase. 20 5 The
United States Supreme Court has upheld this procedure. 206 In South Carolina, on
the other hand, the facts determining eligibility for the death penalty are found at
the sentencing phase. 207 At the guilt phase, the fact finder determines whether the
defendant committed murder; if the fact finder finds that the defendant
committed murder, it then determines at the sentencing phase whether the
murder was in conjunction with a kidnapping or other aggravating
circumstance. 208 If South Carolina designated a separate offense for capital
murder, the issue of whether a defendant maintains a Sixth Amendment right for
a jury to determine aggravating circumstances after pleading guilty to murder
would not arise. Presumably, defendants would have to plead guilty to capital
murder, including the aggravating circumstances, or not plead guilty at all.
Unlike the current procedure, the trial judge would not have to engage in judicial
fact-finding that could enhance the defendant's sentence to death after he pleads
guilty to capital murder.
While creating a substantive offense of capital murder is an option, it is not
the best one. Adopting the capital murder scheme would require the South
Carolina legislature to completely revamp the current capital punishment
procedure that separates the determination of guilt of murder from the
determination of the existence of aggravating circumstances. The constitutional
defects of section 16-3-20 do not require such drastic action. Instead, the

200.
201.
202.
2007)).
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 2003).
Id.; CARTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 99.
CARTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 99 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon 2003).
See CARTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 99.
Id.
Id. (citing Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976)).
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (2003).
See id. § 16-3-20.
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legislature can amend section 16-3-20 to comply with the Sixth Amendment by
simply changing the statute's language to allow for the trial judge to impanel a
jury at the sentencing proceeding after the defendant pleads guilty to murder.
D. Option 4: Amend the Statute to Allow for the Impaneling of a Jury at the
Sentencing ProceedingFollowing a Guilty Plea to Murder
The most practical solution is for the legislature to amend section 16-3-20 to
allow for the trial judge to impanel a jury at the sentencing proceeding when a
defendant pleads guilty to murder. The constitutional problem with section 16-320 is that it denies defendants who plead guilty to murder, but not to any
aggravating circumstances, the option of having a jury determine the facts that
could increase their punishment from the otherwise maximum sentence of life
imprisonment. 20 9 South Carolina is not alone in that regard; at least seven other
states have statutes with the same apparent constitutional defect. 210 South
Carolina requires the trial judge to determine the existence of aggravating
circumstances by mandating that "if the defendant plead[s] guilty, the sentencing
proceeding must be conducted before the judge." 211 By rewording this
requirement to allow the trial judge to impanel a jury after the defendant pleads
guilty, the legislature would fix this unconstitutional provision. Defendants
would then have the option of insisting on a jury trial at sentencing, 212 thus
satisfying the requirement in Blakely that defendants pleading guilty have the
option to demand a jury to determine sentence-enhancing facts. 3 This is the

209. See discussion supra Part IH.B.
210. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201 (2008), declared unconstitutional by People v.
Montour, 157 P.3d 489, 506 (Colo. 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-32.1 (2008); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-50-2-9 (LexisNexis 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 292520 (1995), declaredunconstitutionalon othergrounds by State v. Conover, 703 N.W.2d 898, 904
(Neb. 2005); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.10 (2002); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102 (2007).
211. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (2003) (emphasis added).
212. If defendants choose to waive their Sixth Amendment right for a jury to determine the
existence of aggravating circumstances, they do not retain a right for a jury to determine sentencing.
The United States Supreme Court has held that "there is no constitutional imperative that a jury
have the responsibility of deciding whether the death penalty should be imposed." Spaziano v.
Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 465 (1984). While defendants have a Sixth Amendment right for a jury to
determine the existence of aggravating circumstances that could make them eligible for the death
penalty, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002), they do not have a Sixth Amendment right for a
jury to determine the sentence, Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 464. Thus, if defendants admit to aggravating
circumstances in their guilty pleas or otherwise voluntarily consent to judicial fact-finding, the trial
judge, rather than a jury, can determine the sentence without violating the Sixth Amendment.
Compare Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 310 (2004) (establishing that defendants can waive
their Sixth Amendment right for a jury to determine sentence-enhancing facts by admitting the facts
in their guilty pleas or by voluntarily consenting to judicial fact-finding), with Spaziano, 468 U.S. at
464 (establishing that defendants in a capital case do not have a Sixth Amendment right for a jury to
determine the sentence).
213. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313.
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approach that at least fifteen other states have taken. 214 South Carolina should
follow their lead and amend its statute to allow for the trial judge to impanel a
jury at the sentencing phase when the defendant pleads guilty to murder.
Along with providing for the impaneling of a jury at the sentencing phase,
the legislature should also include a provision that allows for the admission of
evidence relevant to a sentence of death at the sentencing phase. Impaneling a
jury at the sentencing phase to determine the existence of aggravating
circumstances raises an issue concerning what evidence would be admissible.
Would only evidence relevant to the existence of aggravating circumstances be
admissible at the sentencing proceeding? Since the fact-finding at the sentencing
phase is to determine the existence of aggravating circumstances, 215 it is
conceivable that the trial judge could limit the admissibility of evidence to
evidence only relevant to the existence of aggravating circumstances. Because
the defendant pleaded guilty to murder, evidence concerning the murder might
be irrelevant. However, the purpose of the sentencing proceeding is not just for
the jury to determine the existence of aggravating circumstances, but also for the
jury to determine whether to make a recommendation of death after finding the
existence of such circumstances. 216 Therefore, the State would want to introduce
evidence that is not only relevant to the existence of aggravating circumstances
but also relevant to making a recommendation of death.
The State should be able to introduce evidence relevant to a sentence of
death during the jury trial at the sentencing proceeding after a defendant pleads
guilty to murder, not just evidence relevant to the existence of aggravating
circumstances. This would include some evidence of the murder, even though
the defendant admitted guilt, because the jury would probably expect to hear
such evidence before giving a recommendation of death. In every case,4uries
create their own expectations about what evidence they should hear. 2 The
failure of a party to present expected evidence can cause the jury to draw a
"negative inference" through which it punishes that party. 218 Although a party
may stipulate to a fact, that stipulation often does not satisfy the jury's
expectations to hear that evidence. Moreover, merely informing the jury that

214. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a (West 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209
(2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(5)(c) (2004); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 (West 2002); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303 (LexisNexis
2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 175.552 (LexisNexis
2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (LexisNexis 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-1
(LexisNexis 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2001 (2007); OR. REv. STAT. § 163.150 (2007); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (West 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10.95.050 (West 2002).
215. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (2003).
216. See id. § 16-3-20(B)-(C).
217. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 188-89 (1997).
218. Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences
Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1011, 1019 (1978).
219. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 188-89.
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the defendant admitted a fact does not have the same effect as introducing the
evidence establishing that fact to help tell the complete story about what
happened. 220 The United States Supreme Court articulated this idea as follows:
[T]he accepted rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case
free from any defendant's option to stipulate the evidence away rests on
good sense. A syllogism is not a story, and a naked proposition in a
courtroom 22may
be no match for the robust evidence that would be used
1
to prove it.
In a death penalty trial, jury expectations are often extremely high. Because
juries are aware that they hold the defendant's life in their hands, they are likely
to have very high expectations about what evidence they should hear before
recommending a sentence of death. These expectations would probably include
some evidence of the murder, even though the defendant pleaded guilty to it. The
simple admission of the fact would neither carry the same weight as the evidence
of the murder nor tell the complete story about what happened. 222 For the State
to be able to present a legitimate case for the death penalty, the defendant should
not be able to stipulate away the murder evidence; instead, the State must be able
to introduce evidence that is relevant for a jury to sentence the defendant to
death, not just evidence relevant to the existence of aggravating
circumstances. 223
Therefore, any amendment to the death penalty statute needs to contain two
provisions: it must provide for the impaneling of a jury when the defendant
pleads guilty to murder, and it must explicitly allow for the admission of
evidence relevant to a sentence of death at the sentencing proceeding. In drafting
an amendment, Mississippi's death penalty statute, section 99-19-101, provides a
good model. 224 Section 99-19-101 provides for the impaneling of a jury at the
sentencing phase when a defendant pleads guilty to a capital offense and allows
for the admission of evidence relevant to sentencing:
[I]f the defendant pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be
conducted before a jury impaneled for that purpose or may be conducted
before the trial judge sitting without a jury if both the State of
Mississippi and the defendant agree thereto in writing. In the

220. Id. at 188.
221. Id. at 189.
222. See id. at 188.
223. This provision would merely give the trial court discretion in admitting evidence that is
not relevant to the existence of an aggravating circumstance, but is relevant to the sentence of death.
The normal limits on the admission of relevant evidence would still apply. For example, the trial
court would still be able to exclude relevant evidence when it determined that "its probative value
[was] substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." S.C. R. EVID. 403.
224. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (2007).
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proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court
deems relevant to sentence, and shall include
matters relating to any of
225
the aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
The South Carolina legislature could adopt this language verbatim and use it
to amend section 16-3-20 to make it constitutionally acceptable. This
amendment would allow defendants who plead guilty to murder to exercise their
Sixth Amendment right for a jury to determine facts that could increase their
sentence beyond the statutory maximum of life imprisonment to death. While
defendants could exercise this option, they could also choose to waive this right,
which is permissible under Blakely. 226 Moreover, under this amendment, the
State could admit evidence that is relevant to the death sentence and that is
necessary to meet the jury's expectations, which would presumably include
some evidence of the murder, and not just evidence relevant to the existence of
aggravating circumstances. The legislature, therefore, should use the language of
the Mississippi statute when amending section 16-3-20 to make it
constitutionally acceptable. The amended language in section 16-3-20(B) could
read as follows:
If trial by jury has been waived by the defendant and the State, or if
the defendant pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be
conducted before a jury impaneled for that purpose or may be conducted
before the trial judge sitting without a jury if both the State of South
Carolina and the defendant agree thereto in writing. In the proceeding,
evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems
relevant to sentencing, and shall include matters relating to any of the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
By amending section 16-3-20 with the foregoing language, the legislature
would not only provide defendants with their Sixth Amendment right for a jury
to determine sentence-enhancing facts, but it would also ensure the State's
ability to present the full weight of its case for the death penalty.
V.

CONCLUSION

As the law stands in South Carolina, defendants are denied an important
constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment in the most serious of casescapital punishment cases. Even when criminal defendants plead guilty to an
offense, the United States Supreme Court has determined that they have a Sixth
Amendment right for a jury to determine all facts to which they did not admit
and that could extend their sentences beyond the statutory maximum provided
under the facts that they admitted. 227 However, the South Carolina death penalty

225. Id.
226. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 310 (2004).
227. Id. at 303-04.
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statute, section 16-3-20, denies defendants who plead guilty to murder that right
by requiring the trial judge to find the existence of aggravating circumstances
that could enhance the maximum punishment for murder from life imprisonment
to death. 228 In this regard, section 16-3-20 is unconstitutional. Nevertheless,
when South Carolina courts have been presented with the issue in the past, they
have continued to uphold its constitutionality. 229 Consequently, defendants
facing the death penalty continue to be deprived of this important constitutional
right.
The law cannot continue to allow this deprivation. The legislature should
take a proactive approach to ensure that the citizens they represent enjoy all of
their constitutional rights, even in the most unsavory of situations. The
legislature can do this by amending the death penalty statute to allow for the trial
judge to impanel a jury at the sentencing phase to determine the existence of
aggravating circumstances after a defendant pleads guilty to murder. If the
legislature fails to uphold this responsibility, the judiciary must protect this
individual constitutional right by overturning the provision of the statute when
presented with the opportunity. Of course, this also requires attorneys to properly
argue the issue on appeal. Until these actors fulfill their obligations, South
Carolina will continue to deny criminal defendants in capital punishment cases
the fullest extent of their constitutional protections, a situation that should be
intolerable.
Thomas W. Traxler, Jr.

228. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (2003).
229. State v. Crisp, 362 S.C. 412, 419, 608 S.E.2d 429, 433 (2005); State v. Wood, 362 S.C.
135, 143, 607 S.E.2d 57, 61 (2004); State v. Downs, 361 S.C. 141, 146, 604 S.E.2d 377, 380
(2004).
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